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INTRODUCTION

The typical modus operandi of a vulture investor is to
purchase... debt ... or other securities at a discount from
the face amount, and often to purchase sufficient voting
power to enable the vulture investor to block confirmation
of any plan of reorganization proposed for the debtor that the
vulture investor does not like.'
In keeping with this definition, vulture investors are frequently
criticized for the practice of "picking over the bones" of distressed
companies. 2 Yet while some may find this practice as unsavory as the
B.S. Economics 2013, Florida State University; J.D. 2018, University of Florida Levin
of
College Law. Andrew Kelly is an associate and member of the real estate practice group at the
law firm of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor, & Reed, P.A. in Orlando, FL. Andrew previously
worked as an alternative investment wholesaler for CNL Securities Corp. in Orlando, Florida, and
as a law clerk for PODS Enterprises in Clearwater, Florida. While attending law school, Andrew
served as Executive Vice President of the Investment and Finance Law Association at Stetson
College of Law and as a member of the Environmental Moot Court Team at the University of
Florida Levin College of Law. Special thanks to Professor Wentong Zheng for his suggestions
and advice.
1. In re Papercraft Corp., 187 B.R. 486 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995) (quoting Richard Lieb,
Vultures Beware: Risks of PurchasingClaims Against a Chapter 11 Debtor, 48 Bus. LAW. 915,
924 (May 1993)).
2. Jennifer Roberts, A Worthy Alternative to Bonds for Income Seekers: Private Debt,
GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmai.com/globe-investor/a-worthy*
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feeding tactics of the California Condor, perhaps vulture investors
sometimes provide a similar metaphorical benefit by clearing up the
financial decay of over-leveraged entities and facilitating the "transfer of
capital from dying companies to ones that have growth potential."3
This Article will examine the impact of international vulture investors,
also referred to as "holdout" investors in certain contexts, on the
restructuring of Argentinian sovereign debt in the wake of the countries
2001 default.4 With the gift of hindsight, this Article will discuss if
measures could have been taken at the time of debt issuance in order to
better cope with vulture investors should a default situation occur. This
Article will then analyze the restructuring approach taken by Argentina,
focusing on the failure of the Argentinian government to follow
established best practices for a default situation. Finally, this Article will
evaluate the ability of private investors to bring legal action against a
sovereign, highlighting two cases brought by vulture investor NML
against Argentina and the effectiveness of those suits in light of NML's
end goal. 5
While national courts and arbitration pursuant to Bilateral Investment
Treaties may provide avenues for private lenders and institutions to
resolve disputes with foreign nations, these forums often provide
judgments of limited enforceability when ruling against a sovereign.6
However, vulture investors that purchased post-default Argentinian
bonds did successfully impede the resolution of a full restructure by
initiating suits in U.S. federal court, receiving a significant return on
investment when an agreement was reached between Argentina and these
investors in 2016. 7

altemative-to-bonds-private-debt/article33998548/; The Vulture Funds Pickingover the Bones of

the Economic Crisis, MONEYWEEK (Feb. 14, 2013), https://moneyweek.com/the-vulture-fundspicking-over-the-bones-of-the-economic-crisis-62728/.

3. What is a Vulture Investor? Definition and Meaning, MKT. Bus. NEWS,
http://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/vulture-investor/; A Career as a "Vulture
Investor"
is Great, Says
this
Hedge Fund Manager, EFINANCIALCAREERS,

https://news.efinancialcareers.com/us-en/267606/hedge-fund-founder-defends-career-in-vultureinvesting.
4. Arturo C. Porzecanski, The Origins of Argentina's Litigation and Arbitration Saga,
2002-2014, 40 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 41, 59-64 (2016)

5. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 42 ("For the most part, these cases have been heard in the
federal courts of the United States, or else in arbitral proceedings hosted by ICSID, the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes").
6. Anoosha Boralessa, Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of 1CSID
Awards against the Republic of Argentina: Obstacles That TransnationalCorporationsMay

Face, 17 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 53, 55 (2004).
7. Argentina turns page on debt with first bond sale in 15 years, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19,

2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
first-bond-sale-in-I 5-years.
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Now that the dust has settled, it appears that the bargaining chip held
by vulture investors that wish to influence the restructuring approach
taken by a defaulting sovereign relates most to the investor's ability to
8
impede the nation's access to international capital markets. Therefore,
even with the great strides that international plaintiffs have made in the

past five decades, obtaining a judgment against a sovereign nation

remains arguably less important than whether some ancillary or direct
aspect of that ruling, or perhaps even the perpetuation of legal action
9
itself, hinders that nation's access to capital.
I. BACKGROUND
"In December 2001, in the midst of a financial crisis in Argentina, the
Republic [of Argentina] announced a moratorium on its debt service
This moratorium resulted in a mass default of
payments."'
approximately $155 billion of sovereign debt." Over the next decade,
many would refer to this event as "the largest and potentially most
12
complex default the world has ever known." To provide context for the
scope of this default, the GDP of Greece in 2001 was approximately $1503
billion ($5 billion less than the 2001 Argentina sovereign debt default).
Several economic events and decisions by the 4Argentinian
government culminated in the renown 2001 default.' First, the
Argentinian government mandated an exchange rate that held a fixed one5
to-one exchange ratio with the U.S. dollar.1 Second, Argentina primarily
8. Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of
Argentina's Default, 6 CHI. J.INT'L L. 311, 314-16 (2005); No Movement, ECONOMIST, July 31,
2
2014, https://www.economist.com/news/americas/ 1610296-argentina-has-defaulted-again-dea
of international
-its-creditors-not-out-question-no (stating that "Argentina has been locked out
aware that "[i]t
is
government
capital markets for 13 years" as of 2014, and that the Argentinian
grow").
to
needs to borrow
9. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 329 ("The [International Monetary Fund], in particular,
creditors
has had a policy of lending to a government in default of financial obligations to private
to reach
effort
faith
'good
a
making
is
it
only when it is pursuing 'appropriate policies' and when
creditors'.").
a collaborative agreement with its
supra
10. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463,466 (2d Cir. 2007); Porzecanski,
note 4,at 55.
11. A Decline Without Parallel,ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 2002, http://www.economist.com/
y
node/1010911; Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 55 (citing Argentina Ministerio de Economia
at
available
2001,
Trim.
4to
Fiscal
Boletin
Hacienda,
de
Secretaria
Producci6n,
size of the
http://www.mecon.gov.ar/onp/html/boletin/4totimOl/pdf/ fisc25.pdf (estimating the
that the
stating
although
indebtedness,
public
in
default to potentially amount to $145 billion
obligations.")).
in
billion
$95
than
less
default "would likely apply to
12. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 317.
Apr. 12, 2016,
13. Ranking of the World's Richest Countries by GDP (2001), CLASSORA, ?edi
ti n 20
o - 01.
http://en.classo20co/reports/t24369/ranking-of-the-worlds-richest-countfies-by-gdp
311-12.
at
4,
note
supra
Porzecanski,
14.
15. Id.
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borrowed in U.S. dollars and currencies other than the Argentinian Peso
when financing budgetary deficits. 16 This borrowing strategy was ill
advised as Argentina's revenues were due and collected only in
Argentinian pesos.' 7 When forced to service debt in a currency other than
the currency that a nation derives its revenue from, the difference in
intrinsic value of the two currencies can greatly increase the expense of
the debt. 18 Argentina failed to properly hedge the currency risk associated
with this borrowing strategy. 19 Eventually, an "erosion of export
competitiveness, aggravated by fiscal and political indiscipline" of the
Argentinian government, led to a run on available U.S. dollars. 20 The
Argentinian government then imposed capital controls restricting access
to the U.S. dollar. 2 1 Following this "run on the bank" situation, the oneto-one exchange rate of Argentinian pesos to U.S. dollars could not be
maintained, and the Argentinian peso was significantly devalued.22 This
devaluation of the Argentinian Peso rendered the Argentinian
government insolvent as it was unable to service its obligations (payable
in dollars) with the revenues it was taking in (collected in devalued
Argentinian pesos).23
The financial turmoil led to an immediate change in the political
landscape of Argentina. In the same month that the default occurred in
2001, then Argentinian President Fernando de la Rua resigned and was
succeeded by President Adolfo Rodriguez Saa.24 After President Saa's
short tenure, President Eduardo Duhalde was elected in 2002.25 Argentina
was then led by President Nestor Kirchner from 2003-2007, followed by
President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner from 2007-2015.26 Argentina's
current President, Mauricio Macri, took office in 2015.27 Excluding

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Dan Clarke, Importance of Currency Hedging Foreign Investments,
EXPAT FINANCE,
http://expatfinance.net/importance-of-currency-hedging-foreign-investments
(last visited Apr. 3,

2018).
19. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 311-12.
20. Id.
21.

Id.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Presidents of Argentina Since 1900, WORLD ATLAS, https://www.worldatlas.com/
articles/presidents-of-argentina-in-the-20th-and_21st-centuries.html;
Sarah Marsh & Brian
Winter, A Timeline of Argentina's Sordid History With Default, Bus. INSIDER
(July 30, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/a-timeline-of-argentinas-sordid-history-with-default-2014-7.
25. WORLD ATLAS, supra note 24.
26. Id.
27. Alexandra Stevenson, How Argentina Settled a Billion-Dollar
Debt Dispute With
Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/O4/25/business/
dealbook/how-argentina-settled-a-billion-dollar-debt-dispute-with-hedge-funds.htmi.
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has been led by six different Presidents
interim Presidents, Argentina
28
present.
to
from 2001
In the three years following the default, Argentina did little to
negotiate with creditors, instead calling for expansive debt forgiveness
and eventually proposing a "take-it-or-leave-it" restructuring plan to
creditors in early 2005.29 The 2005 exchange offer "allowed . . .
and
bondholders to exchange their defaulted bonds for newonunsecured
30
dollar."
the
cents
29
to
25
of
rate
a
at
debt
external
unsubordinated
This exchange offer closed with a participation rate of 76 percent in June
2005.31

Over the course of 2003-2005 however, Argentina experienced an
economic rebound.32 This economic turnaround fostered more hostility
in the restructuring process, because by the time Argentina made its first
exchange offer in 2005 creditors were less willing to agree to substantial
amounts of debt relief.33 From the perspective of creditors, Argentina's
economic state had greatly improved by 2005 compared to the depleted
Argentinian "coffers" of 2001.3.
In 2010, Argentina initiated a second exchange offer "substantially
identical to the 2005 offer." 35 Between the two exchange offers,
Argentina was able to restructure "over 91% of the foreign debt on which
it had defaulted in 2001 .,36 However, a multitude of suits were brought
in the courts of various countries by the remaining 9% of "holdout"
investors. 37 These holdout investors either bought the Argentinian debt
post-default and were attempting to profit from the maximum amount of
recovery they could achieve above their purchase price (vulture
investors), or simply were unwilling to take 38the significant haircut
required under the terms of the exchange offers. In addition to lawsuits
filed in the United States and other national courts, many creditors
initiated arbitration proceedings against Argentina before the
28. WORLD ATLAS, supra note 24.

29. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 56-57.
30. NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2012).
31.

Id.

32. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 58.
33. Id.

34. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 58-59 ("The impression thus conveyed by the authorities
Argentina was suffering from a case of unwillingness, more than inability, to pay.").
that
was
35. NML Capital,699 F.3d at 252.
36. Id. at 253.
37. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 64 (Present Particle A form 18-K Annual Report Filed by
Argentina with the SEC in 2011 indicates over 150 individual lawsuits in the United States, and
nearly 650 legal proceedings in Germany).
38. Samuel Oakford, Talons Out: Argentina Desperately Fighting "Vulture Funds" Over

Debt, VICE NEWS (June 18, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/talons-out-argentina-desperatelyfighting-vulture-funds-over-debt.
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International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).3 9
"Most claimants would allege that the emergency measures taken [by the
Argentinian government] in 2001-2002 were inconsistent with the fair
and equitable treatment standards set forth in various bilateral investment
treaties to which Argentina was a party., 40
This Article will primarily focus on the actions brought by one vulture
investor, NML Capital, Ltd. (NML), a Cayman Islands-based investment
firm that is the offshore subsidiary of Paul Singer's Elliott Management
Corporation. 41 In the case of NML, Bloomberg reported that the company
initially purchased just $182 million in Argentinian bonds at roughly 2030 cents on the dollar, with the second circuit noting that "hedge funds
and distressed asset investors" purchased defaulted Argentinian bonds all
the way up to 2010.42
By February 2016, the Argentinian government would reach a deal to
pay four "vulture" investors (NML, Aurelius, Davidson Kempner, and
Bracebridge) a combined $4.65 billion to satisfy the principle and interest
on their bonds. 43 Following this settlement, in spring 2016 Argentina
participated in its first international bond issue since its 2001 default for
a total of $16.5 billion.4 4 Argentina utilized $9.3 billion of this capital to
satisfy all debt still held by the holdout bondholders (primarily composed
of vulture funds), thus finally bringing to an end Argentina's long and
tedious post 2001 restructuring process.4 5
II. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES
While all bonds inherently contain some risk of default, investing in
the sovereign debt of well-established and economically stable nations is
commonplace, and sovereign debt is frequently issued across the globe.4 6
This sovereign debt, similar to other bonds, is issued with both
39. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 73.
40. Id.
41. See Georgina Hurst, New Argentina Debt Crisis Spells Trouble for Custodian
Banks,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3383263/

banking-and-capital-markets-emerging-markets/new-argentinadebt-crisis-spells-trouble-forcustodian-banks.html#.VJb4Af97AA.
42. Peter Eavis, Banks Fear Court Ruling in Argentina Bond Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
25,

2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/20 13 /0 2 / 2 5/banks-fear-court-ruling-in-argentina-bond-deb/

?_r=0; Jake Johnston, Vulture Turns to Pirate: Blocks Argentine Ship from Leaving
Ghana,
CENTER FOR ECONOvIC AND POLICY RESEARCH (Oct. 11, 2012), http://cepr.netfblogs/theamericas-blog/vulture-turs-to-pirate-blocks-argentine-ship-from-leaving-ghana; NML
Capital,

699 F.3d at 251.
43. How Argentina Settled a Billion-DollarDebt Disputewith Hedge Funds,supra note
28.
44. Id.

45. Id.
46. Dion Rabouin, Total global debt tops 325 pct of GDP as government debt jumps: 11F,

REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-debt-iif/total-global-debt_
tops-325-pct-of-gdp-as-goverment-debt-jumps-iif-idUSKBN 1401 PQ.
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"boilerplate" bond covenants, as well as specific covenants that are
47
tailored more closely to the specific debt issuance. In NML v. Argentina,
NML brought suit because Argentina "had been paying creditors which
had agreed to its punishing restructuring terms, but had not paid anything
48 This suit was made
to its lawful restructuring holdouts [such as NML].
49
covenants.
possible due to several provisions in the bond
First, the covenants contained a waiver of sovereign immunity,
5°
meaning that Argentina could be sued in a U.S. court by NML. Second,
the covenants provided a "creditor-friendly version" of the pari passu
treatment and payment
clause that essentially "promised [NML] the same' 51
"
bondholders.
other
its
priority as it would afford
A sovereign issuer could potentially prevent disputes with future
holdout investors by removing either or both of these clauses from its
bond covenants. However, while a country may dictate the terms of its
own debt issuance, the terms are typically influenced by what 52investors
are looking for in light of other comparable debt on the market. If other
nations are issuing debt on more creditor favorable terms, a nation may
53
face difficulty raising capital if it fails to offer the like. Furthermore, a
country may not be as concerned with contractual terms of a bond
issuance protecting against vulture investors because it foresees minimal
of the covenants by foreign
risk of default or believes the 5enforceability
4
limited.
somewhat
is
investors
Therefore, while it is important for countries to understand the
ramifications of their bond covenants, the average sovereign in need of
capital likely will issue debt with terms similar to other market comps.
Any derivation from other similar and readily available debt may prevent
the issuer from raising its desired capital at its desired cost. For these
reasons, customizing bond covenants to avoid or protect against holdout
investors down the road may not be possible or practical. It is perhaps

47. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 134 (2012).
48. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 45 (citing NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
No. 12-105(L) (2d Cir. 2013), available at http://www.shearman.com/-/media/Files/Services/
Argentine-Sovereign-Debt/2013/Arg33_NMLSecondCircuit Decision. pdf).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Anna Gelpern & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation after the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign
Bond Contracts Since 2003, 4 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 85, 86 (2009); Porzecanski, supra note 4,

at 314 ("After all, the international capital markets are exceedingly transparent and competitive
when compared with most other markets for goods and services.")
53. Smith, supra note 5.
54. Choi et al., supra note 47, at 136.
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more important to follow a number of other established best practices in
sovereign wealth management and sovereign debt restructuring. 55
ITT.

ARGENTINA'S RESTRUCTURING APPROACH

A country's approach to restructuring may be even more essential in
managing the impact of vulture investors than taking preventative
measures at the time of sovereign debt issuance. For example, failure to
promptly begin negotiating with creditors may provide vulture investors
more time to develop their investment strategy and amass more bonds,
thereby increasing the amount a country must spend in order to reach an
agreement retiring this debt.56
The most productive steps taken by Argentina in regards to
restructuring took place with bond exchanges in 2005 and 2010.57 In these
exchanges bondholders traded "defaulted bonds for new unsecured and
unsubordinated external debt at a rate of 25 to 29 cents on the dollar. ' ; 58
Critics of the way the restructuring was handled note that Argentina's
failure to take action sooner, combined with the "coercive and aggressive
way the authorities in that country went about managing, defaulting, and
restructuring their debt obligations" resulted in much litigation and
ICSID arbitration that could have been avoided.59
In a similar situation in 2012, Greece defaulted on approximately
$265 billion of sovereign debt, a default which was much larger in scope
than Argentina's. 60 However, the Greek default attracted far less
litigation, even though the restructuring imposed heavier losses on
bondholders. 6' One author suggests that this is because Argentina failed
to abide by the following established principles of sovereign wealth
management:
*Engage in regular dialogue with creditors on key
economic and fimancial policies.
*Consult with creditors on how to forestall debt-service
problems before defaulting.
*lf a debt restructuring becomes inevitable, enter into
timely, good-faith negotiations.
* Stop incurring debt when already burdened by too much
debt.

55. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 53-54.
56. Porzecanski, supranote 4, at 56-57.

57. Id. at 64.
58. NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2012).
59. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 53.
60. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 52-53.

61. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol30/iss1/2
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* Seek debt relief appropriate to the nature of the liquidity
or solvency problem.
*Recognize interest arrears, and treat them preferentially
versus past-due principal.
eSeek the financial support and endorsement of
multilateral agencies.
eMake a good-will, up-front cash payment - especially
when circumstances permit.
participation, in order to
*Aim for 100% creditor
62
problem.
holdout
a
minimize
By failing to abide by these best practices, Argentina not only availed
the international
itself to the threat of vulture investors, but also fostered
63
State".
Rogue
"Financial
a
as
perception of Argentina
Rather than engaging in the best practice of negotiating with creditors
in good faith following the defaults in 2001, Argentina simply stated in
February 2002 that it was "making every effort" to develop a new
economic program and had plans to "engage in fruitful dialogue with
64
Argentina's external creditors." However, no dialogue was initiated in
2002 nor 2003, and Argentina's largest creditor at the time, IMF
(International Monetary Fund) "summarized the post-default situation"
in this manner:
[T]he authorities were expected to negotiate with creditor
committees that were judged to be representative and formed
in a timely manner. Although there were over thirty
creditors' committees, the Fund assessed that the Global
Committee of Argentina Bondholders (GCAB) represented
about one-half of Argentina's external private debt, and was
therefore representative for the purposes of [our] policy. In
the end, however, no constructive dialogue was observed
and the authorities presented a non-negotiated offer, which
eventually led to a restructuring of eligible debt and past-due
of total debt, more than three
interest of about two-fifths
65
years after the default.
Had Argentina moved faster to begin its restructuring efforts, it may
have had the opportunity to negotiate terms with creditors while the
The
62. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 54 (citing Lex Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt:
(2003)).
Case for Ad Hoe Machinery, 95

63. Eighth Time Unlucky, ECONOMIST (July 31, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21610263-cristina-fern-ndez-argues-her-countrys-latest-default-diferent-she-missing64. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 56.
65. Porzecanski, supra note 4, at 56-57 (quoting IMF, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
Policy Framework, Apr. 26,
Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund's Legal and
3 42 6
2

2013, 36, availableat https://www.imf.org/extermal/np/Pp/eng/ 01 /0
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future of Argentina's recovery was uncertain and potentially bleak. In a
situation where the goal is to repay lenders as little as possible, it
behooves a defaulting debtor to negotiate repayment plans while it has
little to offer. In Argentina's case, the country pushed off any
restructuring until 2005 despite the moratorium on debt repayment
occurring in 2001.66 Had Argentina locked a plan in place prior to the
economic rebound of 2003-2005 vulture investors may have had less
interest in purchasing Argentinian debt because they would view their
upside as limited. Promptly beginning negotiations with bondholders
after a default or preemptively opening communication about an
impending default may result in the creditors agreeing to more substantial
relief. Therefore, even though the debtor may wish to stave off creditors
for a time, if the economy of the nation improves then the debtor
potentially risks missing its ideal window for negotiation.67 Prompt,
arms-length negotiation with creditors provides a debtor with a higher
likelihood that the terms of a restructure will be accepted by 100% of the
outstanding creditors.
IV. PRIVATE INVESTOR ACTIONS AGAINST SOVEREIGN NATIONS

Enforcement of judgments against a sovereign nation, whether in the
context of a national court or ICSID arbitration, presents problems for
private investors. 6 1 "ICSID itself has no formal role in the recognition
and enforcement of an award under the ICSID Convention." 69
Furthermore "there is no bilateral or multilateral convention in force
between the United States and any other country or reciprocal recognition
and enforcement of judgments., 70 Therefore, even if a private party has
standing to bring suit against a sovereign nation the judgment may
provide no practical restitution to the plaintiff. Despite this plaintiff's
predicament, it is important to note that individuals have taken a giant
leap forward in the ability to bring an action against sovereigns in the past
fifty years. 7'

Prior to 1972 there was no codified United States law that enabled a
private individual to bring an action against a foreign nation. Therefore,
there was no standing for a corporation, individual person, or group of
66. See generally Porzencanski, supra note 4.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Recognition and Enforcement - ICSID Convention Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (2017), https://icsid.worldbank.org/

en/Pages/process/Recognition-and-EnforcementConventionArbitration.aspx.
70. Enforcement of Judgments, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE - BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS (2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/intem
-judicial-asst/Enforcement-of-Judges.html.

71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2017).
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72
investors to bring suit to recover from a defaulting sovereign debtor. In
order to allow a more direct route to address grievances with foreign
nations without directly involving the Department of State, the United
73
States enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1972 (FSIA).
a
The FSIA serves as the "sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over
' 74 The
court."
U.S.
a
in
foreign state and its agencies and instrumentalities
desired effect of the FSIA was to codify the "'restrictive theory' of
foreign sovereign immunity, which grants immunity to75 a foreign
sovereign unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies." One such
immunity, either
exception applies when a sovereign waives its right to
76
implicitly.
or
covenant),
explicitly (such as in a bond
Without the standing provided today by the FSIA, vulture investors
would have substantially less ability to derive return from distressed
debt. 77 With no FSIA, investors who purchase bonds solely for the ability
to bring suit based on the debt security would have contractual rights
under the bonds, but no standing to bring suit in U.S. court based on those
rights. Utilizing their rights under the FSIA, NML led a group of plaintiffs
in two unique suits. The first action sought attachment of Argentinian
assets in the United States as a way to satisfy the monetary obligations
owed to them as bondholders. 78 The second action sought injunctive
relief in the form of a court order enjoining Argentina from making
payments to exchange bondholders without making comparable
79
payments on the defaulted bonds held by NML.

A. NML v. Banco de Argentina-An Unsuccessful Attachment Action
Unsurprisingly, one of NML's strategies to recover payments owed to
them by Argentina was to go after Argentinian assets held in the United
States. While a foreign nation may balk at an award of damages when the
plaintiff has no way of making them pay up, NML specifically sought
Bank (BCRA)
attachment of funds held in account of Argentina National
8 ° If NML could
(FRBNY).
York
New
of
Bank
at the Federal Reserve
successfully obtain a court order for attachment and execution of these
funds, the judgment's enforceability would (hopefully) not be as
problematic because it would not require Argentina to produce any form
72. Katherine Birmingham Wilmore & Douglas K. Mullen, Foreign Sovereign Immunity
and the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act, 36 INT'L LAW. 435, 435 (2002).
73. Id.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
Wilmore & Mullen, supra note 72, at 436.
NML Capital v. Banco de la Republica Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 197 (2d Cir. 2011).
NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2012).
Banco de la Republica Argentina, 652 F.3d at 177.
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of payment, but would simply give NML an interest in Argentinian assets
already held in the United States.
The trial court held in favor of NML, stating that the funds were
subject to attachment because they were considered the Republic of
Argentina's property (not the property of BCRA "held for its own
account") and that this property was "used for commercial activity". 8 '
NML's success at the District Court level was short-lived however, as the
second circuit reversed on appeal. The appellate court stated that the
Argentinian funds held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were
actually property of BCRA "held for its own account., 82 While the
appellate court noted that Argentina had explicitly waived its sovereign
immunity, the bond covenants did not mention "'instrumentalities' of the
Republic or BCRA in particular, much less BCRA's reserves at
FRBNY. ' ' 83 Therefore, Argentina's sovereign immunity waiver was
"worded broadly" and did not "appear to clearly and
unambiguously
waive BCRA's immunity from attachment, as it must do in order to be
effective." 8 4 To summarize, the second circuit's decision hinged on the
fact that the funds at the FRBNY were property of BCRA "held for its
own account" and were deemed independent from the property of
Argentina, therefore BCRA's immunity from suit as a central bank was
not waived by Argentina's separate waiver of sovereign immunity in its
bond covenants.8 5 A takeaway from this suit is that when obtaining a
waiver of sovereign immunity, it may behoove a cautious lender to
require a waiver that references both the sovereign as well as any
instrumentalities of that sovereign.86
B. NML v. Republic of Argentina-The Injunctive Windfall
In a more successful action, NML brought suit seeking an injunction
to force specific performance of the bond covenants based on the
presence of an "equal treatment" pari passu clause. 87 The clause
provided:
[t]he Securities will constitute ... direct, unconditional,
unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic
and shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference
among themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic
under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally
81.

Id. at 183 ("the provisions of the FSIA when properly applied, permitted
[the]

attachment and restraint [of the Funds]"); 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2017).
82. Banco de la Republica Argentina, 652 F.3d at 196.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NML Capital,699 F.3d at 251.
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unsecured and
with all its other present and future 88
unsubordinated External Indebtedness ....
NML successfully argued that Argentina was in violation of this
"equal treatment provision" because the country was making payments
to other bondholders who had accepted the restructuring terms offered in
2005 and 2010, but the country was making no such payment to the
vulture investors. 89 Despite Argentina's desire to treat the holdout
investors different from those who accepted the exchange terms, the
district court held that holders of the same debt may not receive90different
bond covenant.
repayment treatment in light of the parripassu
The second circuit upheld the lower court's ruling for NML in this
suit, granting summary judgment for breach of the paripassu provision
and "ordering Argentina to make 'ratable payments' to plaintiffs
concurrent with or in advance of its payments to holders of the 2005 and
relief was
2010 restructured debt." 91 The court noted that injunctive
92 First, NML was
reasons.
of
appropriate in this situation for a number
not limited to acceleration of the debt as the sole "contractually agreed
upon remedy." 93 Furthermore, monetary damages would be "an
ineffective remedy for the harm plaintiffs have suffered as a result of
Argentina's breach" because "Argentina will simply refuse to pay any
judgments." 94 The court noted that Argentina had essentially refused to
by "closing the doors of its courts to judgment
pay any judgments
95
creditors."
The unique tailoring of the courts relief in this case was also crafted
to remain in compliance with FSIA Section 1609.96 This section
establishes that "the property in the United States of97a foreign state shall
be immune from attachment arrest and execution." The relief granted
did
by the court was not barred by Section 1609 because the judgment
98 The court
Argentina.
not attach, arrest, or execute upon any property of
explained that the injunction simply directs "Argentina to comply with
its contractual obligations not to alter the rank of its payment obligations.
[The injunctions] affect Argentina's property only incidentally to the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 254.
92. Id. at 261.

93. Id. at 262 ("Under New York law the absence of the parties' express intention in the
[bond covenants] to restrict the remedies available for breach of the agreement means that the full
panoply of appropriate remedies remains available.").
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (2017).
98. NML Capital,699 F.3d at 262.
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extent that the order prohibits Argentina from transferring money to some
bondholders and not others." 99
By practically assessing the enforceability of the relief available to
them, NML was able to secure a judgment that did not result in the
payment of court-mandated damages, but provided useful leverage to the
investors in continuing to seek the maximum possible return in the
restructuring process.1 0 0 Because the judgment prevented Argentina from
making payments to the exchange bondholders without paying the
holdouts, the country was faced with the choice of defaulting again on
10
the exchanged debt or reaching a settlement.*
Both of these actions by NML highlight how vulture investors utilize
national court systems, albeit to varying degrees of success, in order to
achieve the end goal of return on investment. 10 2 While the game is far
from won simply because the plaintiff investors have standing or obtain
a judgment, the vulture is successful if the judgment, whether practically
enforceable or not, provides them a better chance of deriving value above
their purchase price of the debt. The primary way in which legal action
allows a vulture investor to derive this value is by directly or indirectly
limiting the sovereign's access to international capital, thus forcing the
sovereign to negotiate with the vultures in order to move forward.
Although now it is possible for a plaintiff to more directly secure assets
of a defaulting sovereign if those assets are held in the United States and
the issuer has waived immunity (or another exception to immunity
applies), the courts hesitancy to grant attachment of Argentinian assets to
NML indicates that the chances of directly recovering damages from a
sovereign are still remote. 10 3 Furthermore, if a defaulting sovereign
anticipates a suit by creditors seeking attachment of its assets, the nation
can simply take steps to move these assets outside the jurisdiction of the
court.
CONCLUSION

To avoid the potential headache of prolonged disputes with holdout
investors in the event of a default, sovereign nations should proactively
establish a well-crafted set of sovereign wealth management best
practices. If a nation is able to implement consistent guidelines across
multiple administrations, vulture investors may be less incentivized to
engage in drawn out disputes over the course of a restructuring.
Specifically, addressing defaults in a good faith and expedient manner
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. No Movement, ECONOMIST (July 31, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/
americas/21610296-argentina-has-defaulted-again-deal-its-creditors-not-out-question-no.
102. NML Capital,699 F.3d at 265; Banco de la Republica Argentina, 652 F.3d at 197.
103. Banco de la Republica Argentina, 652 F.3d at 177.
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can reduce the impact of vulture investors. The longer a debtor waits to
resolve a default and begin negotiating with creditors, the less likely a
restructuring plan will be agreed upon by all creditors and the more likely
a holdout situation will occur. Avoiding prompt negotiation with
creditors may also deprive the debtor of the opportunity to negotiate for
maximum debt relief, which creditors may only be willing to agree to at
a time when the debtor is in its worst financial shape.
While following these practices may decrease the likelihood of
vulture involvement, there is no doubt that these investors will continue
to utilize all available legal tactics to derive a return from distressed debt.
In this way, firms such as NML will help further shape the law regarding
investment disputes with sovereign nations. After all, it can only be
expected that when a vulture detects a carcass, it will try to find a way to
eat.
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